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Tokbek [Talk-back], Israeli Speech  
Economy, and Other Non-deliberative 
Terms for Political Talk
Gonen Dori-Hacohen
INTRODUCTION
mi shebadak et hatguvot ba’internet, kikar ha’ir shel yamenu
Anyone who checked the comments on the internet, the current city square
Ofer Shelakh, http://www.ynet.co.il/home/0,7340,L-363–2781769,00.html, 08.10.2003
hatok-bek hu zirat hatguvot shel golshim be’atarey internet isra’elim, uverosham Y-net shel “ye-
diot axronot.” . . . hatok-bek hu rak lix’ora emca’i lekidum diyin ciburi besugiyot bo’arot.
The toke-bek is the arena of comments of internet surfers in Israeli internet sites, heading by Ynet 
of “Yedito Axronot.” The tok-bek is only allegedly a tool for promoting public debate on 
burning issue.
Roegl Alper, http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.940574, Haaretz News Paper, 23.01.2004
Hatokbekim, tguvot hakor’im shebe’atar hainternet shel “yediot akhronot” veakhar kakh shel 
“maariv” hekhelu behanhagatam, nir’u keme’ein hide park virtu’ali. Khagiga lademokratya 
velekhofesh hadibur.
The Tokbekim, readers’ comments in the internet website of “Yedi’ot Axronot” and then later 
“Maariv” started using, looked as some virtual Hyde Park. A celebration of Democracy and 
freedom of Speech.
Baruch Kimerling, http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1020523, Haaretz newspaper, 21.06.2005
These three quotes are taken from news articles that leading Israeli commenters and scholars 
have written regarding the Israeli online commenting arena. For Shelakh, currently a Parliament 
Member of the progressive “Yesh Atid” party, online commenting is the metaphoric city square, 
where people gathered to discuss and debate public issues. For Alper, a renowned author, the 
commenting arena, he calls tokbek, is a potential arena for public discussion. For Kimerling, 
one of the leading Israeli sociologists of the 20th century, the tokbek presents a potential of 
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democratic process and freedom of speech. These commentators framed the Israeli online com-
menting arena, the tokbek, within the larger discussions of civic engagement, public deliberation, 
and democratic life. This framing is shared by both practitioners of this arena and outsiders 
observing this communication process. Therefore, this chapter uses this communication arena 
and the term for talk that captures it, the tokbek, within its larger speech economy, in light of 
discussions of public deliberation and civic engagement.
Discussions of ordinary people’s talk about current affairs and politics are central to many 
streams of thought in the social sciences and in communication. Habermas (1989) may be taken 
as the originator of these discussions. As a German sociologist educated in the Frankfurt school of 
thought, Habermas used empirical comparative–historical analysis to find out how what Shelakh 
calls “the city square” developed to have democratic discussions. The 18th- and 19th-century 
England, French, and nowadays German, city squares were filled with coffee shops and saloons, 
and these places and the discussions in them created a “public sphere.” In this public sphere citi-
zens openly discussed the actions of the government, in order to improve it. The open discussion 
was several-fold: First, the discussion was open for all participants who wanted to participate; 
second, the participants were open to change their minds following a rational discussion; third, 
the open access presumed equal status to all participants. This openness allowed a free argumen-
tative discussion among equal citizens, who become critical of the government in order to change 
and improve social life.
Habermas’s description of the public sphere led to much further research on the participation 
of ordinary people in public discussion about politics, yet the demands for openness, both of 
access, open-mindedness, and process of discussion remain a staple of public deliberation. Many 
of the discussions of the public sphere (including Habermas’s own work, ironically) are perceived 
as theoretical, not to say idealizing the forms of public talk, and therefore ungrounded in actual-
ity. In previous research I demonstrated that Israeli radio phone-in shows, an arena for ordinary 
citizen participation in mediated political talk, resemble the Habermasian ideal (Dori-Hacohen, 
2012). Unlike radio phone-ins, which received no term for talk, Israeli online commenting arena, 
where citizens have free access to comment about political (and other) topics, received, as Alper 
noted as early as 2004 (before most other cultures had these commenting arenas), a term for 
talk—“hatokbek” the tokbek. This chapter follows the tradition of the Ethnography of Commu-
nication (originating in Hymes, 1972) and Carbaugh (1989), who focused on emic terms for talk 
and on collecting these terms to understanding their cultures.
Following the tokbek, this chapter studies emic terms for political talk. I use a two pronged 
approach to doing this: I describe the tokbek and move from it to discuss the Israeli speech econ-
omy and how it facilitates non-deliberative political talk (here I can be taken as an emic member, 
being an Israeli). Then I suggest two other terms for talk from other cultures that share some of 
the meanings of terms for political talk. I suggest that the Israeli speech economy, as depicted 
in the tokbek, and its equivalent from Hungary and Bulgaria designate terms for talk that lead 
to non-deliberative political discussions, as opposed to the one suggested by Habermas (among 
many others I have no space to relate to here). Whereas the theories emphasize deliberation at the 
centre of political discussions and tightly connect talk to action (Arendt, 1998), the emic terms 
describe arenas that are voided of deliberation and from action.
THE ISRAELI SPEECH ECONOMY FOR NON-DELIBERATIVE  
ACTION-LESS POLITICAL TALK
I would like to start with the Internet, which some theorists (cf. Dahlberg, 2007) have sug-
gested has democratic potential—having many participatory affordances, egalitarian forms for 
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discussions, and autonomy from governmental impositions—all conditions for a functioning 
public sphere. Indeed, Israeli Internet sites have had a feature that only later became popular in 
other countries: the “comments section.” This commenting section may become the epitome of 
the public sphere—ordinary people discuss public affairs from their perspective as citizens, at 
times even critically, which then may lead to action. Within the subgenre of Internet journalism, 
as Alper and Kimmerling noted above, and especially regarding political topics, such responses 
received their own term for talk: tokbek (sing.) or tokbekim (pl.) and a tokbekist (the author of a 
tokbek). The tokbek stands in stark contrast to theorists’ demands of democratic public delibera-
tion as it depicts non-deliberative action-less political life.
The Social Phenomenon and the Cultural Meaning of Tokbek
As Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a) argued, tokbek refers to a technological feature that started 
in the mid-1990s. In terms of webpage structure, an article is usually followed by a series of 
advertisements and a commenting template that invites readers to insert new responses. The 
actual comment thread appears below this commenting template. Each tokbek has a title and a 
commenter’s name and place of residence. Below these parts, there is a place to deliver the pri-
mary message of the response.
Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a) have identified two recurring oppositional terms at the 
tokbek that mark paradigmatic personifications of political agendas: the leftist and the rightist. 
These political sides, like most politics in Israel, center on the relations between Israel and its 
Palestinian and Arab neighbors regarding the Territories Israel gained during the 1967 war: the 
“left” is dovish in negotiating towards a peace agreement including leaving the Territories; the 
“right” is hawkish, rejecting such negotiating and prefers keeping the Territories for security and 
religious reasons. These tokbek identities are mutually constitutive through various rhetorical and 
linguistic forms. This opposition, which organizes the tokbek discourse as political exchange, 
reveals a fundamental schism in the Israeli society. The rightist and the leftist types of person-
hood, as Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a) argue, believe to have nothing in common in terms 
of a shared history and sentiments for the state. Some of Dori-Hacohen and Shavit’s features are 
summarized in Table 24.1, representing the views each side holds of the other.
The form of exchange Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a) found for the tokbek is a “commu-
nicative ritual” (cf. Philipsen, 1987, p. 250). However, as they argue, unlike many rituals, which 
create shared functioning societies:
the tokbek ritual is unique in the sense that it symbolizes the radical absence of a “sacred object,” 
i.e., an organizing normative principle to which the participants adhere. Thus, the tokbek ritual 
Table 24.1 The Semantic Field of Opposition between Leftists and Rightists
Personhood Leftist
(as portrayed by rightists )
Rightist
(as portrayed by leftists )
Section of population Elite Commoner (ha’Am)
Historical comparison Diaspora Jews Fascists (Nazis)
Nationalism Too little: dissolving the national  
state
Too much: expanding the state to its 
destruction
Sentiment Too peaceful and naïve Violent and murderous
(adapted from Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013a, p. 370)
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reveals a contradiction between content and form because within it, social integration is organized 
around a shared sense of disintegration.
(Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013a, p. 371)
This ritual, at least on one website, NRG.co.il, became formulaic, that is, the commenters 
themselves started acting the same way posting similar repetitive leftist or rightist tokbekim. The 
same comments repeat themselves in different stories, and following a leftist tokbek, the same 
rightist tokbek may appear, and vice versa. This repetition is noticed by other participants, who 
then remark on this repetitive exchange, as demonstrated in Excerpt 1:
Excerpt 1
1.  12. bibi ubenet hem ha’iyum harecini beyoter al bitxon Yisra’el—lo Da’esh velo Iran. (l”t)
Bibi and Benet they are the most serious threat to Israel security—not Isi”s and not Iran.
(n”c)
20:47 15/01/15
2. >muxamad, maspik lehacif et haatar. (l”t)
Muhammad, enough with flooding the site. (n”c)
22:00 15/01/15
3. >ata mecif kol katava vekore lexol mi shelo xoshev kamoxa “aravi”. ata umlal. (l”t)
You flood every article and call whoever thinks not like you an “Arab”. You are
wretched. (n”c)
22:15 15/01/15
4. >ani mecif et axotxa. vehi nehederet be’od ata mevale im harav alon. sotte. (l”t)
I flood your sister. And she is wonderful while you are enjoying with Rabbi Alon.
Perv. (n”c)
07:59 16/01/2015
(NRG website, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/670/036.html)
The tokbek ritual starts with an initial act of “political statement” that carries necessary 
commentary about the political identity of the writer. The author of comment 12 (1:1) reads 
an article and then responds by referring to the prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his 
nickname “Bibi” and to the minister of economy by his last name, and claims that these 
two Right-wing leaders are the threat to Israel security (1:1). This statement (it is not an 
argument since it lacks any reasoning), presents its author as leftist, since he (for reasons 
I explain below, I refer to tokbekists as men) harshly and unabashedly criticizes the Right-
wing leaders.
The thread continues when another tokbekist responds to comment 12. The second tokbek 
(1:2) refers to the first tokbekist as “Muhammad,” a reference that was made possible partially 
because of the former tokbekist’s lack of identity (cf. Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013b). The sec-
ond tokbekist claims that Muhammad “floods” the site with his comments. Both moves are aimed 
to delegitimize the first author: by referring to him as “Muhammad,” the second respond tags the 
prior commenter as an “Arab” and therefore at the extreme (read illegitimate) left in Israel; more-
over, in certain parts of the Israeli society being called an Arab is an insult; by claiming “flooding 
the site” he suggests the prior commenter does not respond to this particular article but acts auto-
matically as a leftist writer, regardless of any specific content. Both elements undermine a leftist 
tokbek; hence this tokbek constructs a rightist author. This is the second and the last move in the 
tokbek ritual, establishing the second identity and explicitly presenting the opposition between 
the leftist and the rightist tokbekists. These two moves, of writing a leftist tokbek followed by 
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a rightist tokbek (or vice versa) can then continue, and Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a) argue 
they do endlessly throughout the tokbek discourse.
Since this pattern is now recognized by the participants themselves, the next move in this 
thread points to the repetition (1:3). The second comment (1:2) can be found after many leftists 
tokbekim at nrg.co.il, therefore the third tokbek (1:3) uses the same accusation the second tok-
bek accused the first one—of writing the same comment regardless of the tokbek or the article 
throughout the site. Then, he describes the prior tokbek move of referring to whoever disagrees 
with him as an “Arab.” Thus, the third tokbek points to the repetitive patterns of the second 
tokbek to undermine that position. Since the tokbek ritual is one of affronts, this tokbekist calls 
the prior “wretched.” Therefore this is a leftist tokbek opposing a rightist’s move against another 
leftist.
The last tokbek (1:4) responds to the rightist tokbek (1:2) as well. This tokbek is belligerent 
with sexual insults. I will not decipher them now, however, the reference to “Rabbi Alon” shows 
this commenter refers to the second tokbekist as religious, which is usually thought of as rightist 
in Israel. This tokbek also ends with a personal insult—“perv.”
This excerpt, and others like it (discussed in Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013a,b), exemplified 
the tokbek ritual in which rightists and leftists exchange insults and use the tokbek arena mainly 
to present their identities. The comments have no valid arguments or attempts to create argumen-
tative discourse. Neither side tries to establish a logical, reasonable, or even polite discussion. On 
top of presenting a tokbek ritual and its features, this excerpt also presents how the participants 
are aware of the repetitive elements of the tokbek.
Looking at the interaction in the tokbek in light of theories of public discussion, we can see 
it falls short of meeting the theorists’ conditions. In the tokbek arena, as described above and in 
details in Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a), there is an exchange of political texts, which is a 
ritual of two political moves—mutual attacks and insults of the other side. Analyzing the com-
municative moves called for by political theorists such as Habermas (1989) suggests that in a 
political deliberation process there should be an exchange of at least three moves: presentation 
of first opinion, of a second different one, and then either a conclusion or a counter to the second 
one. In this process all moves are based on argumentation and on openness to change opinions. 
The tokbek does not meet these requirements: no argumentative process takes place and the inter-
action has two moves, not three. Therefore, the tokbek cannot be seen as a deliberative arena but 
an arena for political exchange. Moreover, since it is focused on talk, and not action, the tokbek 
has little effect on political life or can lead to little social change, since it is a self-contained sys-
tem. The tokbek, as a term for talk, denominates a political discussion without deliberation and 
without social action (Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013a). As we see next, this term and its meaning 
fit well within the Israeli speech economy.
The Tokbek and its Relations to Other Israeli Terms for Talk
Quite a few Israeli terms for talk were described in past research, mainly by Katriel (1986, 
1991), and the main one discussed by Katriel was the dugri, and its development into kasah and 
firgun. Other researchers study other terms for talk, relevant to our discussions are: the sticker, 
the freier, and Katriel’s kiturim (griping), and I will discuss them and the speech economy they 
create.
The Sticker and the Tokbek
One can connect the tokbek to the bumper sticker (Bloch, 2000, Salamon, 2001), a mode of com-
munication that was quite popular in Israel until recently. Unlike the USA, in Israel the bumper 
sticker was mainly political (Bloch, 2000), thus enabling a car owner to present a political identity 
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in public. As Bloch summarizes, the bumper sticker is a means for citizens to express their mem-
bership in cultural community (membering, to use Philipsen’s, 1989 term), while being open to 
the entire population to participate (Bloch, 2000, pp. 72–73).
These features hold true to the tokbek. Everyone can write a tokbek, and it is a means for the 
participants to express their political affiliation. Moreover, much like the sticker (Bloch, 2000, 
p. 73) the tokbek has wide range of tones: although the abusive is the leading tone, one can find 
ironic, humorous, and at rare times, enlightening tokbekim. As Salamon (2001) and Bloch (2000) 
suggested, the sticker can be made out of hybridization of prior stickers and can use prior slogans 
to develop new positions. Both elements exist in the tokbek: tokbek can use hybrid language 
(being serious and non-serious at the same time, using various modes of persuasion, cf. Kohn & 
Neiger, 2007). Moreover tokbek writers refer back to prior comments to flip the position presented 
in them: recall the word “flood” (excerpt 1) and how the different tokbekists used it back and forth.
Bloch also argued: “the vast amount of interaction between the stickers provides unlimited 
scope for an ongoing dialogue.” (2000, p. 49) However, this dialogue, unlike the tokbek dialogue, 
is imaginary. This argument is based on analyzing communicative moves, following the one 
I presented above. Unlike the tokbek, which has some dialogic aspect to it, the sticker presents 
one move—the presentation of an opinion or identity, without any actual second move, therefore 
no dialogue is created.
Although the sticker has one move of presenting an opinion, and the tokbek is a ritual of two 
oppositional moves, they share a basic premise. Both are used to present a political identity, while 
avoiding any deliberative democratic process, argumentation, or openness to change of opinions. 
The tokbek to some degree replaced the sticker, which are less visible in current Israel. Yet, this 
argument needs further research, and the demise of the sticker may be due to the increase of polit-
ical violence in Israel (which Salamon hinted to [2001]). In the past, for presenting a political 
identity one could choose to put a bumper sticker on one’s car; currently one can participate in 
the tokbek ritual to achieve the same goal.
The Tokbekist Is Not a Freier
I stated earlier that the leftist and rightist believe they share substantively very little, yet they 
share an Israeli cultural identity—being an Anti-“Freier” (Bloch, 2003).
The Freier is another Israeli term for talk, more specifically a term for personhood. Bloch 
(2003) discusses many features of the “Anti-Freier” and explains that in Israel the danger of 
social situation is to be seen as “Freier.” The Freier is a weak, conforming, and feminine loser. 
The tokbek discourse is rooted in and is a manifestation of the anti-Freier identity. Much like the 
driving scene in Israel that Bloch described (2003), there is little respect to the other participants 
in the tokbek arena. Therefore, the tone of the tokbek is aggressive, and is getting harsher through 
the years, a point that awaits a diachronic study of the tokbek.
The combative tones of the tokbek fit the competition in which the anti-Freier must partic-
ipate. The competition is repeated in the tokbek, where leftists and rightists are in a battle none 
of them win, since it continues endlessly. Losing an argument may be taken as a sign of freier, 
therefore tokbekists cannot concede a point. Moreover, since arguing assumes some notions of 
accepting or respecting the other side, the anti-freier cannot argue; he as the tokbekist must expli-
cate his truth, while disregarding other opinions. Indeed, as illustrated above (ex. 1), this is the 
tokbek discourse—no arguments but only claims and statement of facts are used; each author 
presents his position, regardless of opposite opinions, and accompanies it with an insult towards 
those disagreeing with him. An anti-Freier cannot argue, and indeed tokbekists rarely do.
This competition together with the anti-freier machismo features explain much of the mas-
culine, not to say sexist, tones of the tokbek discourse (and my referring to tokbekists as men). 
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Take for example 1:4 above: its author insinuates that he has sexual relations with the prior 
author’s (1:2) sister, that the prior author is a homosexual, and calls him pervert, an insult. Thus, 
in the tokbek dominating your enemy’s females is a victory; being feminine, not to say presenting 
a “non-normative” sexual identity is always an insult, since hegemonic masculinity is required 
and expected. Relatedly, feminine voices are chastised more harshly than masculine ones, a point 
that deserves further illustration in future research.
As Bloch argues, the anti-freier phenomenon leads to a lose-lose situation and Dori-Hacohen 
and Shavit (2013a) share this view as depicted in the tokbek. The conclusions from the freier 
framework fit well with that of the tokbek. As Bloch concludes:
The freier frame represents a dissolution of the very notion of communication itself. Its use brings 
about a situation in which actors are no longer motivated toward social interaction, but toward 
satisfying intrapersonal needs, as individuals coddle their own egos with no thought for the other 
and worse, to the their detriment.
(2003, p. 154)
The tokbekist is therefore an anti-freier, and indeed, the communication between anti-freier in 
this arena leads to: “the communicative premise that the participants in this ritual share is that no 
communication can take place between their two groups” (Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013, p. 374).
The Tokbek Is a Bashing Ritual
In their analysis, Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a) relied heavily on Katriel’s (cf. 1986, 2004) 
work. Katriel described the rise and deterioration of the Israeli term for talk dugry, which 
demised to two forms, the relevant of them is kasah (bashing talk) in contemporary Israeli public 
discourse. In her words kasah is:
Forceful speech marked as kasah does not carry the attenuating impact of a shared, legitimating 
code. Rather, it is interpersonally directed as a put-down, unmitigated by the invocation of a cul-
tural frame that might warrant its aggressiveness. Kasah as brute force tends to be associated with 
the growing factionalism and radicalization of Israeli social life, which implies an absence of a 
consensual system of symbols and meanings.
(Katriel, 2004, p. 208)
The underlying metaphor of the kasah is that of a boxing match much akin to the exchange of 
tokbeks between participants. Recall excerpt 1: from the very first comment, the style of the 
tokbek is direct and aggressive. The first tokbekist takes the Right-wing leaders to be the biggest 
threat to Israeli security—an extreme position, which poses a threat to the face both of these 
leaders, and especially for their followers, who read the tokbekim. This aggression toward the 
rightists is answered, and this thread continues as a bashing ritual. From name calling (from 
“Muhammad” to “miserable” and then to “perv”), to mirroring accusation, the thread presents a 
ritual of disrespect, akin to a verbal boxing match. Indeed, as Dori-Hacohen and Shavit (2013a) 
argued, the online public discourse marked by the cultural term tokbek is a kasah fest that com-
municates radical pessimism about its very communicability, which mirrors the social relations 
anti-freier personhood creates and which makes this political discussion lack any reasoning or 
consequences regarding actions.
The Tokbek as a Griping Ritual
Whereas the tone the tokbek follows is of the kasah, its function may be related to another term 
for talk: kiturim, the “griping ritual” (Katriel, 1991). It is a ritual in which citizens meet and 
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discuss political topics or social problem to vent their opinions, reaching the conclusion that little 
can be done to promote change. Katriel suggested many etymologies for the word “kiturim,” one 
of them is shared by the next tokbekist:
Excerpt 2
http://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.2455241# 
 49. Toda lesSharon veRotem, aval xevr’e, ma yihiye? namshix lehit’acben velixtov 
tokbekim kedey lehoci kitor uvashavu’a haba nashuv lexayeynu veniten lahem leham-
shix laxmos velirmos 
 Thank you to Sharon and Rotem, but guys, what will happen (be)? We will continue to 
get upset and to write tokbeks so to get out steam, and next week we will have return to 
our lives and will have allow them to continue rob and trample 
 vaad pe’ula 15:04 / 10.10.2014 Steering (literally action) Committee
This tokbek relates to an article about the extravagant wedding ceremony of the former chairper-
son of Israel’s largest trade union, and how he hosted all the capitalists and well-to-do business-
people in Israel, including all the rich politicians. The article hinted to the corrupt Israeli economy, 
in which politicians (including trade union leaders), businesspeople, and regulators divest public 
funds. Unlike many appreciative tokbekim, this tokbek scolds the other for using the tokbekim to 
“get out steam” in Hebrew “lehoci kitor,” which resembles kiturim, griping. For this tokbekist, 
writing tokbekim is a form of griping, since it enables complaining about social problems without 
doing much about them. Indeed, this tokbekist states it explicitly, as he accuses the other partic-
ipants of doing nothing to change the situation—and even his name “steering committee” (vaad 
pe’ula in Hebrew) suggests action is needed, which the commenter argues tokbekim are lacking.
Similarly, the next comment accuses the commenters of griping, although not in so many 
words:
Excerpt 3
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4215946,00.html 
 8. naxon, amiti urecini . . . . . . aval. . . yisra’el, Isra’eli karagil. . . . yikre’u, yixtevu kama 
tokbekim. . . .veyakhzeru lehitlonen velivkot 
 Correct, true and serious. . . . . .but. . . . Israel, Israeli As usual. . . . (they) will read, (they) 
will write some tokbekim . . . and (they) will return to complain and crying
This tokbekist accuses all other tokbesists of basically griping in this arena. The griping 
ritual allows for a highly engaged citizen to do very little other than talking about the prob-
lems. The tokbek enables its writer to participate in a political scene, to express an opinion, 
to present a political identity, even to negate others’ political identity, and to take no further 
political action, as this commenter, with the generic Israeli name, suggests. Dori-Hacohen and 
Shavit (2013a) suggested that the tokbek can be the extension of the griping ritual, in giving 
its participants a sense of political agency, much like the sticker, without any political action 
(other than membering). As exemplified in excerpt 2, and as the writer of excerpt 3 explains, 
much like the griping ritual, the tokbek does not lead to social change. Griping and the tokbek 
are therefore akin to whining, crying, and changing nothing. Hence, the griping ritual and the 
tokbek ritual enable their participants to feel politically engaged, while doing very little to 
promote change.
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The Israeli Speech Economy and Non-deliberative Political Talk
In the Israeli speech economy, the tokbek is a term for talk that relates to many other terms for 
talk that center around public talk and relations of people in public; all share some elements of 
aggressive non-deliberative no-change social relations. The tokbek, as part of the kasah style, 
are rooted in the anti-freier personhood, therefore Israelis must participate in a bashing ritual 
whose main goal is to present a political identity (like the sticker). This speech economy creates 
no opening to communication (especially in the American sense, Katriel & Philipsen, 1981) and 
enables whining and complaining about social life without transformation, either personal or 
social, and therefore contributes to a stagnant social and political life.
This picture follows prior research of Israeli terms for talk. Katriel argued that the Zionist 
dugri style opposed the diasporic Jews’ separation between action and talk and transformed the 
new Israeli into a doer and actor in the world (Katriel, 1986). Alongside the deterioration of dugri, 
symbolizing the diminishing of traditional Zionists views, the Israeli speech economy returned to 
stress talking without acting in the world, thus (a)voiding politics (at least according to Arendt, 
1998). This speech economy has terms that share politics of reasonless presentation of identities, 
with no listening to other opinions, and without any action. The goal of the tokbek and the sticker 
is to present an identity, not to discuss it nor changing the political realm (Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 
2013a). The griping ritual enables concerned citizens to talk yet to not do. These terms are rooted in 
the anti-freier personhood and in political exchange use the kasah tone. The Israeli speech economy 
has terms for political talk that share the lacking of deliberation or motivation for social change.
Putting this speech economy in a critical light, we may connect these terms with some 
ideal view of political deliberation. From this perspective, this speech economy enables public 
participation, even a political one, yet not a deliberative one. The Israeli speech economy stands 
against the deliberative view of democracy. According to both the consensual view of public 
deliberation (Habermas’s public sphere is the cornerstone of this theory, 1989), and the agonistic 
view of public deliberation (Mouffe, 2000 represents this view), a democratic political delib-
eration should be open to transformation of opinions, meaning its participants need to be open 
to change their mind and opinions following the results of the discussion. Moreover, at least 
according to Habermas, and Mouffe does not dispute this view, the deliberation should be based 
on some rationality, if not on reason. All of these are missing from the Israeli speech economy 
when it comes to terms for political talk. Thus, these terms for political talk allow much political 
ado about nothing.
TERMS FOR NON-DELIBERATIVE POLITICAL TALK ELSEWHERE
Whereas the Israeli picture may seem bleak, it may be so only when compared to Western- 
theoretical perspectives. Bringing in terms for political talk from cultures that transformed to 
democratic governance recently shows similarities to the Israeli speech economy. That is, other 
cultures also share terms for political talk that lack the deliberative element and emphasize pol-
itics without rationality, deliberation, or action. These societies share terms for talk that enable 
engaged public life with little democratic values. I follow Carbaugh’s (1989) and Philipsen’s 
(1989) work comparing terms for talk and ways of talking in different cultures. Although this is 
an etic comparison, Carbaugh distinguished various elements to compare terms for talk. Out of 
his elements, I will focus here on the function the terms of talk encode, on the tone they entail, 
and on the social identities they create and enable. The terms I am about to compare all share the 
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function level—the function of the terms is to create civic engagement, that is public participa-
tion by citizens regarding public affairs. The tone of the speech events the terms encode is one 
of heated engaged discussion, and the identities they create are of the concerned citizen, at time 
with distinguished political affiliation. The efficacy of the communication behind the term is 
debatable, the communication processes behind the terms are useful to maintain a social status 
quo, and whether such a status quo is good is up for the reader’s discretion.
The tokbek and the Israeli speech economy correspond to research on hate-speech in Hun-
gary and to oplakvane in Bulgaria. These terms and way of talking represent the societal function 
of ordinary (and non-ordinary) people discussing public topics in mundane or mediated situa-
tions. Moreover, all these terms focus the public talk on the talk itself and not on political action 
or change, therefore their efficacy is questionable.
The Tokbek and/as Hate Speech
The tokbek can be seen as hate-speech, yet without the sanctions hate-speech receives (although 
there are discussions how to, even legally, “civilize” the tokbek). This view of tokbek as hate-
speech suggests, as Boromisza-Habashi argued (2015), that hate-speech is context and cultural 
sensitive. Indeed, there is no equivalence term in Israel to “hate-speech” (dibur-sin’a is a literal 
translation, which sounds funny to a Hebrew speaker, and divrey sitna is too archaic). The rac-
ist (calling another commenter “Muhammad” as an insult or as a mere de-legitimation move) 
or the misogynistic (“perv” and the debasing hint of homosexuality) texts above, and similar 
expressions, are not viewed as legally (or normatively) problematic. Thus, although the tokbek 
discourse promotes hate among different groups (not only leftists and rightists), stereotypes, 
and biased group relations, they do not fall under a legal definition of censored talk in Israel or 
“hate-speech.”
The promotion of hate relates to the tone of the tokbek, which is similar to that of the hate-
speech. Both share an engaged, even heated tone of interaction. Additionally, as Boromisza- 
Habashi (2012) explains, hate-speech comes to denominate belligerent public talk, although what 
counts as belligerent is contested. Boromisza-Habashi (2012) suggests that both style and con-
tent can be seen as part of hate-speech. If one looks closely at the tokbek discourse, most tokbek 
would fit one definition or another of “hate-speech.” Recall excerpt 1, in which homophobic and 
racist comments were made out in the open without sanctions or outrage: tokbekim are moderated 
after publication, and unlawful or problematic tokbekim are taken down. Therefore the tokbek 
presented above and other aggressive comments (see Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013a,b; Kohn & 
Neiger, 2007) are acceptable in this domain.
Not just in style and content, but in social identities, there is a resemblance between the 
discourse denominated by hate-speech and the tokbek. Boromisza-Habashi (2012) describes the 
basis of hate-speech as follows: “Once a speaker chooses a model of identity offered to him or 
her by agonistic discourse, the discourse also ‘tells’ the speaker how the identity can be used to 
relate to other relevant identities” (2012, p. 49). The set of identities the hate-speech is based 
upon in Hungary mirrors those in Israel—“Leftists” and “Rightists” although, of course, with dif-
ferent histories. Moreover, the bashing style of the tokbek, which is used by both political sides, 
resembles the use of the accusation of hate-speech, which is exercised by both political sides in 
the Hungarian society. It seems that the motive to engage in discussions about hate-speech is 
mainly to present oneself as belonging to the correct political camp.
This opposition between political identities may explain the ritualistic way in which hate-
speech is at times enacted. When Boromisza-Habashi discusses occurrences of hate-speech he 
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presents a ritual of hate-speech. In this ritual one participant (say a rightist) accuses the other 
political side of using hate-speech, and then the table is turned and the other participant accuses 
the first participant of using hate-speech towards the other side (cf. Boromisza-Habashi, 2015: 
excerpt 2). This ritual of accusation resembles the tokbek ritual since both rituals mainly solidify 
each participant’s identity. Moreover, Boromisza-Habashi (2012) shows how using hate-speech 
enables both political sides in Hungary to achieve presenting the other side as extreme and radi-
cal. Accusing of hate-speech creates an empty political discussion, as arguments may be termed 
hate-speech, therefore demanding no further rebuttal.
Thus, the hate-speech label may create political identities for the participation in a ritual-like 
heated tone of communication process. This process may lack argumentation and social change, 
much like the tokbek. In this process, the hate-speech resembles the tokbek in reducing what may 
be a space for political deliberation to a space for political exchange; reducing the communica-
tion process to a ritual with two moves, that repeats the current standings of the participants and 
is based on their political identities of “leftists” or “rightists.”
Hate-speech is one way of talking (and I assume others exist in the Hungarian speech econ-
omy) that enables a Hungarian society, like the Israeli one, to continue functioning with a major 
political–historical schism in it, without solving the tear and without moving towards changing 
the political situation and the social problems in that society. Using hate-speech, much like the 
tokbek and griping, enables citizens to participate in what seems to be a vibrant and stimulating 
political life, yet one that lacks deliberative process or motivation for social change.
Tokbek and Oplakvane
Since the Israeli speech economy creates political engagement and exchange without delibera-
tion and change, and since similar things can be said about hate-speech, it is interesting to com-
pare this function to the Bulgarian case, as Sotirova (2013) writes:
Bulgarians have been in a period of transition for so long, with the constant expectation of change 
(marked by significant alterations in policies, politics, governments, alliances, and institutions), 
that this has only left the population with a bitter taste and no observable (to the individuals them-
selves) changes in the status quo.
(this volume, p. 23)
The term of talk that enables this keeping of the status quo while talking about social and political 
situation in Bulgaria is oplakvane (Sotirova, this volume). Much like the Israeli griping ritual, 
oplakvane is a ritual of narrating corrupt public life, about which participants themselves can do 
very little. The goal of the oplakvane ritual is not to offer solutions to Bulgaria’s social or political 
problems, but instead to assert that the social situation in Bulgaria remains as problematic as it 
is right now and no change can be seen for its future. The tone of oplakvane and griping is more 
moderate than the tokbek and hate-speech, but these terms also create the concerned citizen as a 
social identity for their participants.
It is this lack of change while being talkative about politics that put oplakvane and tokbek 
(see excerpts 2 and 3 above) and griping in the same group of terms for public talk. They capture 
a discourse that creates political engagement without political change: citizens talk but do not 
argue but agree about political issues, yet the discussions lead to no political change. These terms 
for talk are there to help their societies, societies with problematic and weak democratic struc-
tures and traditions, to keep their malfunctioning political structure intact.
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CONCLUSION
These terms for talk in Hungary and Bulgaria and the Israeli speech economy as a whole promote 
stagnancy over social change while creating politically engaged environments. One could argue 
their efficacy is in enabling a stagnant political structure in their respective cultures while show-
ing political involvement. They change the ideal of democratic deliberation from being oriented 
for social change, therefore based on argumentation, openness, and at least three moves in the 
interaction, to political exchanges that preclude argumentation, openness, and social change. 
These terms enable politics without change, since this politics is about the social identities of the 
participants; the talk remains at the talking level and does not lead to action.
Putting the tokbek within the Israeli speech economy shows how the tokbek is an exten-
sion of the sticker, its function resembles that of the griping ritual, but it has a bashing tone 
to it and is rooted in the anti-frieir personhood. In this description I highlighted the similar-
ities between the terms for talk, but there are differences. The griping ritual has no bashing 
elements and therefore is different from the tokbek. The sticker has physical elements that 
tokbekim lack, and the anti-freier was argued to operate mainly at the social and interactional 
level, not the political level. Yet, in spite of these differences, the Israeli speech economy 
seems to accommodate and create many terms for talk that encode paradoxical communica-
tion—communicating without believing in the ability of communication, due to the deterio-
ration of social cohesion (Katriel, 1986, 2004). Since the social and political issues in Israel 
are complex, and since no cohesion for social change can be found, Israeli politics remains 
stagnant, and the same political problems linger without change for generations. Therefore, the 
culture comes up with mechanisms, captured by the terms for talk griping and tokbek, which 
enable the continuation of the stagnant political life, while letting citizens feel they meaning-
fully participate in political life.
Lack of social cohesion that leads to and is a result of stagnant social and political life is 
not unique to Israel, nor is the lack of political change and the void of social change due to civic 
life. Societies with stagnant political life need mechanisms for their citizens to participate in 
political life without changing them. The tokbek, griping, oplakvane, and hate-speech all con-
tribute to this function with their unique cultural meanings (which I did not highlight here, for 
example the more sensitive relations of hate-speech in Hungary as compared to Israel). They 
enable political life without change. In Israel, Bulgaria, and Hungary, terms for political talk 
all capture politics that is void of action and change; it is political exchange and not political 
deliberation.
Studying emic terms for political talk and their speech economy suggests a divide between 
actual political talk and theoretical political discussions. The emic terms highlight the lack of 
elements, which theorists stress are the essence of democratic politics: deliberation and change. 
For theorists, political talk is a process of looking for the societal good by logical argument 
about public good (Habermas, 1989); the emic terms highlight no reasonableness. For theorists 
political talk is a first step towards social action (Habermas, 1989, Mouffe, 2000) since it is ori-
ented to changing the world (Arendt, 1998). The emic terms stress talk for its own sake, lacking 
referential power. Future research may find cultures in which the terms for talk fit the theoretical 
demands or may find other mechanisms and terms for talk that allow for the creation of non- 
deliberative action-less politics. Additionally, we can further elaborate on the speech economies 
behind the terms for political talk, or flesh out differences in the terms for political talk. Finally, 
one can look at the social structure that leads up to the creation of these terms for talks, and look 
to improve social and political life by promoting social action at the expanse of these stagnant 
terms for talk and their communication processes.
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